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Introduction
* 
 
The Israeli Supreme Court (“Court”) cites American law to borrow its legitimacy.1 The 
Court’s search for legitimacy is—as is every such search by institutions—a combination of 
selectivity and reliance. It is the Court’s pursuit of a recognized authority that speaks to a 
question in need of answering. When the Court must speak with sure authority, it often looks to 
American law to provide such authority.
2
 
 
Jabotinskey v. Weizman, the oldest case discussed below, is a perfect example of such a 
search. In Jabotinksey, decided just three years after Israel became a state, the Court was faced 
with a question of how to interpret Israel’s Basic Law. Its response? It turned to American law in 
its early hour of need, citing to it almost exclusively.  
 
This paper will first provide a background for comparative law citations and their use by 
the Court. Then, it will examine the Court’s reliance on American law in two different subject 
areas: judicial restraint and the separation of powers. This examination will show two trends in 
the Court’s use of comparative law: first, different justices will use comparative law to 
simultaneously elucidate legal philosophy and establish elements of legal tests (sometimes using 
the same comparative law source, but sometimes not); second, comparative law was used as a 
contemporaneous and subsequent response to Israel’s Constitutional Revolution. Finally, this 
paper will examine leadings jurists’ use of comparative law and their motivations for doing so.  
 
I. BACKGROUND  
 
a. Comparative Law Generally 
 
A comparative law citation is a legal citation by a government entity (usually a court) in 
one country to a decision or opinion by a government entity of another country. This paper 
considers only comparative case law citations. Comparative law citations in case law can 
generally be grouped into one of three uses: positive, neutral, or negative. In other words, foreign 
law is used—as is all jurisprudence—as the foundation for a new or evolving legal doctrine; 
additional authority for an already-decided or established legal principle; or, as examples of how 
other nations’ jurisprudence leads to undesired results.  
 
For many nations, including Israel, “[c]omparison is a fundamental tool of scholarly 
analysis . . . [and] plays a central role in concept formation” because comparative law citations 
                                                          
*  
My thanks: First and foremost, to Professor Morag-Levine for putting up with my erratic schedule, consistently 
helping me shape my vision for this paper, and her invaluable and incisive comments—I am so grateful. Second, to 
Professor Bean for her help in deciphering the database and being such a dear friend. Finally, a special thanks to my 
busy father for his help in editing this text during its final stages.  
1
 This includes both Federal and State law. “Borrow” should not be read negatively.  
2
 One note: As an American law student, it is at first hard to conceptualize there ever being a lack of legitimacy in 
the law. For us, each practice area is a veritable jurisprudential castle: legal principles as cornerstones sunk deep, 
sometimes hidden or obscured by time; solid, immovable walls of case law built on these cornerstones, established 
since time immemorial; newer statutory battlements glittering atop these common law walls; and the whole structure 
manned by a veritable army of practitioners, professors, and judges. 
2 
 
highlight distinctions and similarities between cases.
3
 And citing to foreign law is not a one-way 
street travelled only by young democracies. What used to be a “top-down dictation” from well-
established judicial systems to fledgling judicial systems is now an “exchange among peers.”4 
 
Comparative law citations have their dangers. The great hazard of citing to a to foreign 
court is that the citing court may not understand the jurisprudential context of the cited material.
5
 
For example, the American Constitution prohibits religious establishments, whereas Britain and 
Israel do not; indeed, neither Britain nor Israel even have a written constitution. And unlike 
France whose constitution is “resolutely secular,” the American Constitution protects the free 
exercise of religion. Thus, it might be out of place for American courts to use these nations’ 
jurisprudence when deciding religious freedom cases.
6
 
 
Moreover, even if judges attempt to correct for these unsurprising differences by only 
citing comparative law on specific subject areas, jurisprudence is never so clearly categorical. A 
country’ jurisprudence is not a row of neatly arranged boxes from which citations are neatly and 
primly taken. Instead, every citation is plucked from a massive, complex web of ideas and 
philosophies, influenced by innumerable factors, including religious, cultural, historical, and 
economic values. 
 
A final note on comparative law citations: Many justices use citations to foreign cases, as 
they do domestic cases, that were decided in entirely societally or jurisprudentially dissimilar 
conditions, and they do this to advance their personal judicial theories, especially when these 
theories fly in the face of the prevailing political winds.
7
 
 
b. Israel Generally 
 
The Court’s comparative law citations can only be properly understood by laying out the 
foundations and unique challenges of the Court.
8
 In its early years, the Court’s philosophy, 
                                                          
3
 Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 125, 129 
(2005). 
4
 Aaron B. Aft, Respect My Authority: Analyzing Claims of Diminished U.S. Supreme Court Influence Abroad, 18 
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 421, 424 (2011). For example, “[a]s an initial matter, U.S. Supreme Court references 
to foreign sources of law have been far more frequent than might be commonly known.” Id. at 425. 
5
 Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between 
Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT'L J. CONST. L. 519, 528-29 (2005) (“One of the difficulties 
using foreign law is that you don't understand what the surrounding jurisprudence is.”). See also Carlos Bernal, 
Foreword-Informal Constitutional Change: A Critical Introduction and Appraisal, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 504 
(2014) (“Instead, the ‘want-to-be’ foreign citation strategy seems to give upmost [sic] weight to the views of foreign 
courts operating in different political, social, cultural and legal context.”). 
6
 Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The Lessons of History, 
95 Cal. L. Rev. 1335, 1365 (2007).  
7
 See VLAD PERJU, CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSPLANTS, BORROWING, AND MIGRATIONS, IN THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1321 (Michel Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012). See also Bernal, supra 
note 5. (noting that comparative law allows the Court’s individual justices “to make their ideology prevail over 
antagonistic political views that enjoy popular support”). 
8
 A full discussion of the unique geopolitical and regional challenges that have shaped the Court and its 
jurisprudence are beyond the scope of this paper, but its societal attitudes should be briefly examined.  
3 
 
reflecting the values of the newly minted State of Israel, was quite strongly collective in nature.
9
 
However, Israeli society’s focus eventually grew less totally collective and became focused 
slightly more on the individual.
10
 Consequently, the Court’s early jurisprudential framework was, 
to some extent, “based on the values of self-fulfillment and individualism.”11 Since the 1960s, 
the Court has strengthened this individual-centered philosophy by emulating America’s 
jurisprudence.
12
 
 
It is also important to note a few special characteristics of the Israeli political system 
because they do influence the Court’s citations to foreign law. Most importantly, the “Israeli 
political and legal system is a[] . . . combination of a Westminster and a Continental-European 
type of parliamentary democracy.”13 The Israeli Declaration of Independence of 1948 was 
largely taken from the American Declaration of Independence.
14
 Its judicial system mirrors this 
political heritage.
15
 In sum, from its inception, many parts of the Israeli government have drawn 
from more established systems in crafting its political and judicial identity.
16
 
 
c. The Court and Comparative Law 
 
The Court is at least a, if not the, world’s leading comparative law court.17 One scholar 
opined that “one cannot but acknowledge that [the Court] is the most important comparative 
constitutional law institute of the world.”18 For the Court, comparative law is not just a 
theoretical exercise, but “comparative law plays an important role in Israeli case law.”19  
 
                                                          
9
 Eran B. Taussig, Broadening the Scope of Judicial Gatekeeping: Adopting the Good Faith Doctrine in Class 
Action Proceedings, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1275, 1341 (2009). 
10
 Id. (“The reformation of Israeli culture influenced tremendously the Israeli legal system and had a significant 
impact on the reasoning of the justices on the Israeli Supreme Court.”). This initial reliance on collective values is 
unsurprising even if just considering how the State of Israel came to be.  
11
 Id. 
12
 Eli M. Salzberger, A Positive Analysis of the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, or: Why Do We Have an 
Independent Judiciary?, 13 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 349, 357 (1993); Taussig, supra note 9.  
13
 Id. 
14
 The Associate and Assistant Editors, Introduction to Histories of Legal Transplantations, 10 THEORETICAL 
INQUIRIES L. 299, 301 (2009) [hereinafter Histories of Legal Transplantations] (“Yoram Shachar traces the roots of 
the Israeli Declaration of Independence of 1948 to the American Declaration of Independence, composed by 
Thomas Jefferson in eighteenth-century America. Shachar shows that the American Declaration served as a starting 
point for the original draft of the Israeli version, composed by a low-ranking civil servant, Mordechai Beham.”).  
15
 Though, of course, Israel operates without an explicit written constitution, which does starkly deviate from the 
American model. 
16
 See, infra, Section II(a)-(b). 
17
 David S. Law, Constitutional Convergence and Comparative Competency: A Reply to Professors Jackson and 
Krotoszynski, 66 ALA. L. REV. 145, 151 (2014) (discussing how the Court is praised for its “comparative prowess”); 
Andrea Lollini, The South African Constitutional Court Experience: Reasoning Patterns Based on Foreign Law, 8 
Utrecht L. Rev., May 2012, at 55 (naming the Court  as being among the constitutional courts “most active in using 
foreign law”); Alexander Somek, Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second Germanization of 
American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284, n.1 (1998) (“The Supreme Court of the State of Israel 
is the most impressive example of such constitutional borrowing.”).  
18
 Somek, supra note 17.   
19
 Eliezer Rivlin, Israel As A Mixed Jurisdiction, 57 MCGILL L. J. 781 (2012). 
4 
 
Part of the success of the Court is that it is “very careful when using comparative law.”20 
It recognizes that a decision maker must be “quite rooted in the system that one refers to in order 
to be sure that its rules and ideas are interpreted properly.”21 To ensure that court decisions from 
America, Britain, and other countries are understood in the proper context, the Court routinely 
hires clerks from these countries.
22
 (Not everyone agrees that this method is wholly successful.
23
) 
 
Finally, as a rule, the Court’s comparative law citations are to western jurisdictions.24 The 
cultural and linguistic differences between Israel and many of these western jurisdictions would 
normally discourage comparative law citations.
25
 However, this is more than counterbalanced by 
Israel’s common law foundation, imported by the British during their early 20th Century 
governance in Palestine.
26
  
 
d. The Court and the Supreme Court of the United States 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) is often cited by the Court. Most 
significantly, the Court uses SCOTUS’s corpus juris to buttress the legitimacy development of its 
(relatively) young judiciary.
27
 One scholar stated that the Court, “operating without a written 
constitution and in the face of significant uncertainty concerning the scope of its ultimate 
authority, could gain in stature and legitimacy by embracing well-respected and established 
American doctrine”; and, by embracing American law, the “Court may at once have created for 
itself a greater space to fashion limits to guaranteed protections.”28  
 
                                                          
20
 Id. 
21
 Id. (“In order to leverage and use foreign law in a meaningful way, one must hold considerable knowledge and 
expertise in both foreign and local law. For one to have access to foreign law, one must possess both the technical 
tools to approach the law and an understanding of its normative substance.”). 
22
 Somek, supra note 17, at 324. (crediting part of the Court’s comparative law success to its “practice of employing 
clerks from all over the world, who do the research work on their country of origin”).  
23
 Binyamin Blum, Doctrines Without Borders: The “New” Israeli Exclusionary Rule and the Dangers of Legal 
Transplantation, 60 STAN. L. REV. 2131, 2170 (2008) (“The Israeli Supreme Court's use of comparative law to 
justify Issacharov may seem to illustrate one of the primary dangers against which Scalia, Richard Posner, and 
others who oppose the use of foreign law in the United States have cautioned: that comparative law can be used as a 
rhetorical tool to mask personal or political preferences.”).  
24
 Bernal, supra note 5, at 502 (noting that comparative law citations “come mostly from case law produced in 
western jurisdictions”). 
25
 Id. (noting that it “is surprising” that the Court cites so many western jurisdictions “given the legal, socio-
economic, religious, political, and geostrategic differences between the countries that provide and incorporate these 
voluntary citations. It also defies some current literature on the choice of voluntary references, which links those 
references to factors such as ‘linguistic permissibility’”).  
26
 Rivlin, supra note 19, at 782 (arguing that Israel was “was strongly influenced by the British legal system. The 
rules of English common law and the principles of equity were imported into the region”); Blum, supra note 23, at 
2152 (noting that the Court has referred to the American and English legal systems as “similar to our own”). 
27
 Rivlin, supra note 19, at 785. Blum, supra note 23, at 2152 (stating that the Court relies heavily on “precedents 
from . . . the United States . . . to explain why reform was crucial and why courts had both the authority and 
responsibility to initiate it”); Claire L'Heureux-Dube, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the 
International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L. J. 15, 24 (1998) (“Foreign decisions are often used as a 
‘springboard’ to begin development of human rights jurisprudence, and to fill in gaps when no precedent exists.”). 
28
 Michel Rosenfeld, Constitutional Migration and the Bounds of Comparative Analysis, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 67, 73 (2001). 
5 
 
SCOTUS has had a powerful influence on the Court.
29
 For example, SCOTUS’s 
jurisprudence was the foundation of the Court’s aforementioned Revolution.30 Starting in 1995, 
the Court adopted SCOTUS’s approach to interpreting the American Constitution, especially 
judicial review.
31
 Further, in the area of free speech jurisprudence, the Court has traditionally 
relied on SCOTUS most heavily;
32
 though in the past 15 years the Court has moved away from 
this reliance.
33
  
 
Various other spheres of influence include tax structures,
34
 judicial activism,
35
 and the 
use of amicus curiae.
36
 Finally, the Court has shown a reticence, similar to SCOTUS to deal with 
national security issues. In the wake of 9/11, SCOTUS treated many of the Bush administration’s 
sensitive national security decisions as unjusticiable.
37
 Similarly, despite the Court theoretically 
being as rigorous with national security decisions as it is with all decisions,
38
 it has declined to 
deal with sensitive national security issues much like SCOTUS
39
. 
                                                          
29
 Blum, supra note 23, at 2157 (“In legal education as in citation practices, the United States [is] . . . a metropole of 
legal influence upon the Israeli ‘periphery.’”). 
30
 Rivlin, supra note 19. (“In 1995, the Israeli Supreme Court decided, referring to American constitutional law, that 
it had the authority to invalidate ‘unconstitutional laws’. . . . Since then, the Israeli Supreme Court has developed a 
number of constitutional rights from these basic laws, influenced by both the American concept of liberty and the 
European concept of human dignity.”) 
31
 Id. at 784 (“[T]he Israeli Supreme Court--when using its limited powers--was very much inspired by American 
constitutional case law. The “American” liberal approach to interpreting the US Constitution was adopted by the 
Court when interpreting our “regular” legislation.”).  
32
 Guy E. Carmi, “Dignitizing” Free Speech in Israel: The Impact of the Constitutional Revolution on Free Speech 
Protection, 57 McGill L. J. 791, 856 (2012) (“Supreme Court rulings have created common law protection of 
fundamental rights, placing freedom of expression at the top of the protected freedoms.”); HCJ 606/93 Kidum 
Entrepreneurship and Publishing Ltd v. The Broadcasting Authority, 48(2) PD 1, 9 (1994) (“Needless to say that 
‘freedom of expression stands at the top of the liberties upon which our democratic regime is founded.”). 
33
 Carmi, supra note 32 (“[T]he Israeli Supreme Court extended constitutional protection to the unenumerated right 
of free speech via the human dignity clause beginning in late 2006. The nexus between human dignity and free 
speech is tenuous . . . . Israel stands at a crossroads. It is slowly abandoning American influence in the field of free 
speech, and trading it for a human dignity emphasis.”).  
34
 See generally Yitzhak Hadari, Tax Avoidance in Linear Transactions: The Dilemma of Tax Systems, 15 U. PA. J. 
INT'L BUS. L. 59, 97 (1994) (explaining a few American influences on Israel’s tax structures).  
35
 Salzberger, supra note 12, at 358 (discussing the “increasing judicial activism and a Supreme Court that is 
becoming ‘American’ style, with extensive and ever-increasing involvement in the affairs of the government and of 
the Knesset”). 
36
 Israel Doron & Manal Totry-Jubran, Too Little, Too Late? An American Amicus in an Israeli Court, 19 TEMP. 
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 105, 106 (2005) (stating that the recent addition of the amicus curiae “was a significant step in 
the process of ‘importing’ an American legal instrument into the Israeli legal system”). 
37
 Eileen Kaufman, Deference or Abdication: A Comparison of the Supreme Courts of Israel and the United States 
in Cases Involving Real or Perceived Threats to National Security, 12 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 95, 158-59 
(2013).  
38
 The Court explicitly rejects the maxim “when the cannons roar, the muses are silent”; rather, as Justice Barak 
said: “It is when the cannons roar that we especially need the laws.” HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in 
Israel v. Gov’t of Israel slip op. ¶ 61 (1995). 
39
 For example, in HCJ 4481/91 Bargil v. Government of Israel 47(4) PD 210 (1993) the Court declined to rule on 
the filed petition. Bargil, 47(4) PD at ¶ 5 (opinion of Shamgar, J.) In Bargil, the petitioner requested that the court 
find the Israeli government's policy of allowing Israeli citizens to settle in the occupied territories of Judea, Samaria 
and the Gaza Strip to be illegal. Id. at ¶ 2. Relying on American law, the Court held that the petition was too general 
to be justiciable. Id. at ¶ 5. It first stated that the political-question doctrine precluded it from reviewing another 
branch’s branch-unique decision made purely within that branch’s constitutionally-designated power. Id. at ¶ 4. 
Then, pointing to Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 519-21 (1969), it held that the separation of powers requires 
6 
 
 
But, even with all of this reliance, it goes without saying that, in some areas, Israel has 
differences in its jurisprudence. For example, the Court does differ in its description of judicial 
review, relying on a written test instead of different levels of constitutional scrutiny.
40
 Further, 
though for many years the Court’s freedom of expression jurisprudence was based on American 
ideas of individualism and liberty, in the past few decades the Court has relied more on European 
ideas of dignity as its core freedom of expression basis “rather than the American verbiage of 
‘liberty.’”41 The list does not stop here. Issues like Miranda rights,42 standing,43 and the political 
question doctrine,
44
 are all areas of disagreement. Finally, in an unsurprising plot development,
45
 
the Court will occasionally quote American cases and get either the doctrine or the application of 
the doctrine wrong, or both.
46
  
 
e. The Constitutional Revolution 
 
No introduction of Israeli constitutional law would be complete without an overview of 
Aharon Barak’s Constitutional Revolution (“Revolution”).47 Israel, like many countries, has 
legislatively enshrined many of its most fundamental values in a Basic Law. In 1992, the Knesset 
passed two additions to the Basic Law: the Freedom of Occupation, and Human Dignity and 
Freedom. At this time, Israel’s Basic Laws enjoyed no higher status than any other legislation. 
 
Then, in 1995, newly instated President Barak changed this with his decision in CA 
6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Bank 49(4) PD 221 (1995). As the first 
case in which the Court struck down a law as unconstitutional because it violated fundamental 
rights in the Basic Law, the importance of this case cannot be overemphasized. In Mizrahi, 
President Barak created judicial review and, some argue, a constitution.
48
 Mizrahi represents the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Court to consider whether it “is faced with the antecedent question whether a particular branch has been 
constitutionally designated as the repository of political decision-making power.” Id. In other words the Court uses 
Powell to develop this “antecedent” doctrine. Id. Bargil also clarified that the initial question of whether the other 
branch even has that power it purports to have is a different, justiciable question. Id. 
40
 Rivlin, supra note 19, at 785 (“In fact, the court replaced the American case law's concept of constitutional 
scrutiny with a written test for judicial review.”).  
41
 Id. at 785-86. See also Carmi, supra note 32, at 793 (noting a “shift from the American liberty-based influence . . . 
to a . . . non-US dignity-based influence”). 
42
 Rinat Kitai, A Custodial Suspect's Right to the Assistance of Counsel - the Ambivalence of Israeli Law Against the 
Background of American Law, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 205, 219 (2004) (noting several fundamental differences in the 
Court’s jurisprudence and SCOTUS’s jurisprudence under Miranda).   
43
 Kaufman, supra note 37 (“Standing and the Political Question doctrine are issues on which Israeli comparative 
law has differed sharply with the US.”).  
44
 Id.  
45
 See, supra, Section I(a).  
46
 Rosenfeld, supra, note 28, at 70-71, n.16 (noting that “the Israeli Supreme Court's adoption of American First 
Amendment doctrine
 
has led to rulings on certain issues that are inconsistent with American decisions on the same 
issue”). For example, Justice Barak noted that Israel’s use of American doctrine could reach diametrically opposed 
results in hate speech cases as exemplified in a hypothetical he posed in C.A. 399/85 Kahane v. Broad. Auth. 41(3) 
PD 255 (opinion of Barak, J.). This is discussed further in Section III.  
47
 Aharon Barak was the author of several opinions discussed below and was both a Justice on and the President of 
the Court. He will be referred to using the title he had when he wrote the opinion, so pre-1995 as “Justice Barak” 
and post-1995 as “President Barak.” 
48
 Mizrahi, 49(4) PD at ¶ 109 (opinion of Shamgar, Former Pres.). See also Emily Bazelon, Let There Be Law, 2002-
JUN LEGAL AFFAIRS 25, 27 (“‘The thing is, the United States does have a constitution,’ former Justice Landau 
7 
 
culmination of President Barak’s drive to expand Israel’s judiciary—this is where the Court 
“came into its own.” Indeed, Mizrahi is arguably the most important in the Revolution because it 
took the Israeli constitutional law system and added a distinctive aspect of the American system 
by establishing constitutional judicial review.
49
 And, unsurprisingly, American law played a 
central role in this revolution. 
 
The Revolution seemed to, at some level, disturb the balance of power between the 
branches of Israeli government. As a result, many members of the Court use comparative law to 
argue for restraint and a clearer definition the Court’s new role.50 As T-1 and T-2 show,51 many 
of the Court’s judicial restraint comparative law citations were made concurrently with the 
Revolution, and the separation of powers comparative law citations were made a few years later 
and were presumably intended to clarify the Court’s role in government given the sudden 
expansion of judicial power. This increase is strongly indicative of separate, yet complimentary, 
reactions to the Revolution. Thus, the Revolution is quite pertinent for this discussion.  
 
II. SCOTUS’S SPECIFIC INFLUENCE ON THE COURT: JUDICIAL RESTRAINT 
AND SEPARATION OF POWERS.
52
 
 
“For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction.”  
Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion 
 
a. Judicial Restraint  
 
It should come as no surprise that changes so disruptive and relatively radical as the 
Revolution and its flagship case, Mizrahi, were resisted. Now, while a thorough treatment of the 
internal affairs, dynamics, and politics of the Court in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s is 
beyond the scope of this paper, some opinions published during the middle of the Revolution that 
cited comparative law in response to the Revolution are telling. 
 
For example, most of the judicial restraint comparative law citations were a concurrent 
reaction to the ongoing Revolution. Several justices urged caution, often in their concurrences, 
and especially in Mizrahi itself. The distribution of judicial restraint comparative law citations is 
displayed by the chart T-1 below.
53
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
explained in his Ha'aretz interview. ‘In contrast, in Israel, the very decision [Mizrahi] that states that we have a 
constitution that includes court oversight of Knesset legislation was made by the court itself. That’s a completely 
different matter.’”).  
49
 It is called a “Revolution” for a reason, after all.   
50
 See, infra, Section II(a)-(b). 
51
 See, infra, Section II(a)-(b).  
52
 The following cases were chosen from a database compiled by Professors Morag-Levine and Barbara Bean, and a 
host of students who graduated long before my time. I must give a special thank you to Professor Morag-Levine for 
giving me access to this database—it was comprehensive, enormous, easy to navigate, and reliable. I wish I had time 
to discuss more of the empirical numbers, but the focus of this paper is not the empirical, so mention of the 
empirical will be constrained to this. 
53
 “Judicial restraint” is the database coding phrase used to designate which cases specifically discuss judicial 
restraint. In our database, eleven cases discussed judicial restraint. These cases yielded twenty-six total citations to 
American law, twenty-two of which were pulled from ten separate majority or concurring opinions, and four of 
8 
 
T-1 
 
Four Court cases demonstrate the Court’s reliance on American judicial restraint doctrine 
during the middle of the Revolution. The last three cases show how concurrences often urge for 
judicial restraint using comparative law generally, and specifically the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine.  
i. HCJ 652/81 Sarid v. Chairman of the Knesset 36(2) PD 197 (1982) 
 
In Sarid, the petitioner brought suit because the Knesset Chairman had scheduled an 
important Knesset vote at an unusual time.
54
 The petitioner argued that the Court could hear the 
petition because it challenged a decision made by a public official in his official capacity.
55
 The 
Court held that even if the Chairman did violate Knesset regulations, this violation was minor 
and did not require the Court to intervene.
56
 
 
Sarid included only one citation to American law on judicial restraint, and it was used to 
craft a definition of restraint that would preserve the will of the Knesset and the rule of law.
57
 
The Court turned to Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, where American Justice 
Frankfurter stated that determining whether a court ought to rule on a question is always “a 
difficult task that requires use of that ‘expert feel of lawyers.’”58 This is an amorphous standard, 
and it provides the foundation for Israel’s system of judicial restraint and a foil for its rule 
against advisory opinions. The Court called this expert feel standard “an excellent definition of 
the limits of judicial power.”59  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
which were in two dissenting opinions. (Neither of the dissent cases in which those citations appeared are 
discussed.)  
54
 Sarid, 36(2) PD 197 at ¶ 1 (opinion of Barak, J.)  
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Two notes about Sarid: First, Justice Barak used comparative law that was favorable to 
his judicial activism, making the Court’s judicial restraint rule as flexible as possible, perhaps to 
give his future activism legitimacy.
60
 This seems like almost a feaux judicial restraint rule. 
Second, Justice Barak mainly used comparative law in Sarid to enlarge the Court’s authority and 
extend its reach.
61
 Thus, it is ironic that he would also use comparative law in the same decision 
to flesh out judicial restraint—the other side of that coin. 
 
ii. Mizrahi 49(4) PD 221 
 
Mizrahi provides the perfect example of expansion and restraint in the same case. Given 
the bare judicial activism on display in Mizrahi, it is ironic that it includes judicial restraint 
comparative law citations. Just as President Barak uses comparative law in the majority opinion 
to expand the judiciary, Former President Shamgar and Justice Goldberg use it in their 
concurrences as a restraining force. Former President Shamgar and Justice Goldberg cited four 
American cases in their concurrences. 
 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963). This case was used by Former President 
Shamgar to show that President Barak’s creation of judicial review was overreach. Former 
President Shamgar quoted Ferguson, saying that SCOTUS has “returned to the original 
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the 
judgment of legislative bodies.”62 Again, irony—Former President Shamgar is using American 
cases to urging judicial restraint in response to President Barak who used American cases to give 
birth to judicial review and an Israeli Constitution. President Barak distinguished Ferguson by 
framing it as solely a rejection of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which the Court 
does not have to deal with; and, Ferguson properly treated basic rights and economic rights 
under different levels of constitutional scrutiny, whereas “[t]his history is foreign to” the Court.63 
 
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). Former President Shamgar used 
Williamson to show that a law does not have to be perfectly comprehensive and airtight to hold it 
constitutional—a legislature, after identifying problems, can choose to fix some and not others, 
fix some or all problems only partially, or fix none.
64
 Legislatures, he says, ought not to be held 
to a level of the perfection.
65
 Indeed, “a reasonable, non-arbitrary solution expressed in a law can 
befit the values of the state, even if the court would have chosen a solution that would have been 
                                                          
60
 Id. (“This self-restraint must be based on a standard which will define those areas in which the court will not 
interfere out of respect for the uniqueness of the Knesset as the people's elected body, and those in which the court 
will intervene to preserve the rule of law in the legislature.”). 
61
 See, infra Section II(b)(ii).  
62
 Mizrahi, 49(4) PD at ¶ 80 (opinion of Shamgar, former Pres.).  
63
 Id. at ¶ 102 (opinion of Barak, Pres.).  
64
 Id. at ¶ 80 (opinion of Shamgar, former Pres.) (“Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and 
proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think. Or the reform may take one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind . . . The legislature may 
select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.”). 
65
 Id. (“It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular 
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”). 
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more just or sensible, in its opinion, had it been given the choice.”66 The error the Court made in 
Mizrahi is that it searched for a “single solution” rather than allowing the Knesset to choose from 
a range of reasonable choices.
67
 
 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). Former President Shamgar 
used Ashwander in an attempt to restrain that which he could not totally stop. In Ashwander, 
Justice Brandeis extensively discussed the “[u]nique rules [that] have been shaped to serve the 
courts that . . . decide upon the invalidity of legislation on constitutional grounds.”68 Former 
President Shamgar explicitly states that, on this issue, the Court should look to America because 
it “possess[es] a constitutional traditional longer than” Israel’s.69 Looking to America, he noted 
first that SCOTUS “examine[s] claims of unconstitutionality with caution and restraint”; and, 
second, he co-opted Justice Brandeis’s seven principles of judicial review used when the 
Constitution is implicated.
70
 In other words, Former President Shamgar’s concurrence strongly 
urges—based solely on American law—that restraint be exercised when reviewing constitutional 
provisions.
71
 This seems to be his way of trying to make what he saw as an unavoidable harm 
less evil. 
 
Illinois Election Board v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979). Justice Goldberg 
used Socialist Workers to support the idea that economic legislation should not be reviewed by 
degree because any judge could come up with a law a little better or a little worse.
72
 Rather, the 
“Court should declare a law unconstitutional for deviation from the test of degree, only if the 
means that the legislature chose reflects an exceptionally severe deviation from the range of 
reasonable infringement for the fulfillment of the proper purpose.”73 Here, Justice Goldberg used 
American law to set the outer boundaries of degree-based constitutional review. 
 
iii. CA 2401/95 Nachmani v. Nachmani 50(4) PD 661 (1995) 
 
Nachmani, published the same year as Mizrahi, is, at its core, a contemporaneous and 
concurrent reaction to the judicial activism of Mizrahi. In Nachmani, Ruth Nachmani and Daniel 
Nachmani decided to use in-vitro fertilization to get Ruth pregnant, so they had Ruth’s ova 
fertilized using Daniel’s sperm.74 Shortly thereafter, and before the embryo was implanted in the 
surrogate, Daniel sought a divorce.
75
 Ruth requested that the hospital release the embryo for 
                                                          
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. at ¶ 88. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at ¶ 88-89. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. at ¶ 6 (opinion of Goldberg, J.) (“If a test of legality of degree is carried out in this regard, by means of a 
careful examination of the possible alternatives, it will be difficult to find economic legislation that will stand up to 
the test of proportionality. In the words of Justice Blackmun: A judge would be unimaginative indeed if he could not 
come up with something a little less ‘drastic’ or a little less ‘restrictive’ in almost any situation, and thereby enable 
himself to vote to strike legislation down.”).  
73
 Id. (emphasis added).  
74
 Nachmani, 50(4) PD at ¶ 1 (opinion of Strasberg-Cohen, J.).  
75
 Id. 
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implantation, but Daniel disagreed.
76
 Ruth asked the district court for an order, which Daniel 
fought all the way up to the Court.
77
 
 
The topic of judicial restraint plays a minimal role in this case, but the role it plays—as in 
the following case—is cast by a concurrence urging restraint, this time with regards to the 
Court’s unnecessarily specific rules of law. Justice Dorner’s concurrence nicely lays out the three 
rationales used by the opinions to decide which party wins: The majority said that the ultimate 
decision rests with the party not seeking parenthood (Daniel); part of the minority says that the 
decision rests with the party seeking parenthood (Ruth); and, Justices Dorner and Tal argue that 
the Court should not adopt either brightline rule, but should “balance the rights of the specific 
parties.”78 
 
Justice Dorner’s approach is based on Lochner. Quoting Lochner, Justice Dorner 
suggests that the Court should not decide the specific, narrow question of which party controls 
implantation of an embryo just on the basis of general principles.
79
 Rather—using syllogism 
verbiage for a moment—the Court should establish major premises (rules of law), run a 
balancing test to find the minor premise (the rights of the parties), and come to a different (but 
hopefully the best) conclusion in each case.
80
 Anything else, like considering rights only in the 
abstract, he says, could work injustice.
81
 
 
In sum, Justice Dorner uses Lochner to show that a major premise alone is not sufficient 
to decide factually intense cases, and that each case should be decided freshly, thus giving judges 
the most opportunity to work good.
82
 He finally noted that “even a balancing of this kind is not 
an ad hoc balancing without any guiding principles, but it is made on the basis of rules that are 
applied to the special circumstances of each case.”83  
 
iv. HCJ 7052/03 Adalah Legal Centre for Arab Minority Rights in Israel and 
others v. Minister of the Interior 51(2) PD 202 (2006) 
 
In Adalah, the Court considered the legitimacy of a regulation prohibiting Palestinians 
who married Israelis from coming across the border.
84
 President Barak, writing for the majority, 
held that the law—The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision)—was 
unconstitutional.
85
 The part of Adalah that contains comparative law is Justice Rivlin’s 
                                                          
76
 Id. 
77
 Id. 
78
 Id. at ¶ 9 (opinion of Dorner, J.).  
79
 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“General propositions do not decide concrete cases. The 
decision will depend on a judgment or intuition subtler than any articulate major premise.”). 
80
 Nachmani, 50(4) PD at ¶ 9. 
81
 Id. 
82
 At least Dorner is consistent—in ¶ 15 he joins another justice’s opinion, but refuses to join all of the other opinion 
because it partially answers an unnecessary question. This is judicial restraint on full, integrity-infused display.  
83
 Id. 
84
 Adalah, 51(2) PD at ¶¶ 1-3.  
85
 Id. at ¶¶ 113-14 (opinion of Barak, Pres.).  
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concurring opinion, which argued that the majority unnecessarily reached the constitutional 
question.
86
 
 
In his concurrence, Justice Rivlin explained that because intervening “highlights the issue 
of judicial authority,” a judge must “limit[] himself with rules, . . . only address[] what the parties 
brought before him,” and “restrict [] himself to concrete questions of real substance.”87 
Additionally, he quoted Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549 (1947), 
which held that advisory opinions are never acceptable. Rivlin argued that the Court must 
especially follow these rules because declaring something unconstitutional is the “most drastic 
measure that it possesses, which is reserved for cases where it has no alternative.”88  
 
Further, Rivlin quoted Ashwander, pointing out that America has crafted several rules to 
help justices decide whether a constitutional question even ought to be answered.
89
 In other 
words, Rivlin argued hard that the constitutional avoidance doctrine be applied, but the majority 
steadfastly ignored him.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the comparative law citations in Adalah, like those in 
Nachmani and Mizrahi, are contained in a concurrence attempting to restrain what it considers 
the excess of the majority. In each of these cases, the majority opinion was a decision enlarging 
the power of the Court. And in each of these decisions the concurrence relied on American law 
in an attempt to minimize what it considered judicial activism.  
 
b. Separation of Powers90 
 
Two strong themes emerged from the following separation of powers cases: First, almost 
all cases citing to comparative law on the separation of powers include this two-step progression: 
(1) elucidation of legal philosophy using comparative law and (2) adoption of a test contained in 
comparative law for use in deciding an aspect of the separation of powers doctrine. And while 
this may at first appear intuitive, quite often courts do not adopt both the philosophy and the 
rules of authorities relied on. Thus, this consistency and frequency is notable here. 
 
Second, separation of powers cases largely percolated through the judicial system soon 
after the Revolution reached its climax in 1995 with Mizrahi. The chart below shows that the 
number of citations to comparative law on the separation of powers exploded in the three years 
following Mizrahi.  Therefore, it is likely that this increase was a reaction to the disruptive (and 
at least philosophical) changes Mizrahi wrought. 
 
                                                          
86
 Id. at ¶ 1 (opinion by Rivlin, J.) (“My colleague, President A. Barak, wishes to conclude his opinion with a 
determination that the Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), 5763-2003 (hereafter — the 
Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law) is void. There is no need today for this declaration.”). 
87
 Id. at ¶ 3. 
88
 Id. 
89
 Id. 
90
 Israel, like most western countries, views the doctrine of the separation of powers as a philosophical and political 
cornerstone of its democracy. SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 68 (2007) (“One of the most 
prominent characteristics of a democratic regime is its separation of the sovereign powers between . . . three main 
branches – Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, and this . . . characterizes the system in the state of Israel.”). 
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T-2
91
 
  
 
The following five cases demonstrate the Court’s intense reliance on American 
separation of powers doctrine.  
 
i. HCJ 65/51 Jabotinskey v. Weizman 5 P.D. 801 (1951).  
 
One of the Court’s earliest cases—and, certainly, the first on separation of powers—was 
Jabotinskey v. Weizman. Jabotinskey, while obviously not a reaction to the Revolution, is an 
example of the Court’s reliance on American law to build its separation of powers philosophy.  
 
The Court started its separation of powers journey with a bang. It extensively quoted 
landmark American decisions as it molded its basic philosophy of government power 
apportionment—this was pure, unadulterated reliance on American law. Looking to Mississippi 
v. Johnson, the Court adopted the distinction drawn in Mississippi between the President’s 
“political” actions and his “ministerial” powers.92 The Court held that the separation of powers 
did not allow it to disturb an exercise of the President’s political or executive actions.93 The 
Court then discussed Chief Justice Marhsall’s language in M’Culloch v. Maryland, stating: 
 
[W]e may say, following him [Marshall], that were we to accede to the request of the 
petitioners in this case, we would exceed the limits of judicial authority and trespass upon 
the preserves of the political and executive authorities. In the language of Chief Justice 
Marshall, “this court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.” 
 
                                                          
91
 Note the spike to fourteen cases in 1998, just three years after the Court’s decision in Mizrahi.  
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Jabotinskey, 5 P.D. at pg. 12. In sum, the Court’s separation of powers test and its separation of 
powers philosophy were drawn from watershed American decisions that each played a major 
role in America’s separation of powers doctrine.94 
 
Why did the Court rely on American law? First, because SCOTUS has had “considerable 
experience in examining the boundaries between the respective functions of the three authorities 
of the State.”95 Second, not only did the Court consider SCOTUS an authority on the topic, but 
the petitioners did as well, explicitly requesting in their briefs that the Court adopt American law 
to decide the separation of powers question.
96
 
 
Here, unlike in later cases, while the Court relied heavily on American law, it relied to 
establish limits on the Court.
97
 Not surprisingly, the rationale was presented, in part, as purely 
the Court’s, and not as co-opted, long-established American doctrines. The Court came to its 
decision (allegedly) on its own and used comparative law only as evidence that its independent 
decision was correct.
98
 Admittedly, before quoting SCOTUS, the Court held that its decision was 
compelled by the necessity of limiting its docket—i.e., it could not hear everything or it would 
be completely swamped.
99
 It noted “with satisfaction” that SCOTUS agreed with this.100 
 
ii. Sarid 36(2) PD 197 
 
More than thirty years after Jabotinksey, the Court again discussed the separation of 
powers; this time, Justice Barak was on the Court to take a crack at it. As in Jabotinskey, in 
Sarid, the Court used American law to shape its philosophy and rule crafting. Additionally, Sarid 
is a major step in the Revolution because it imbued the Court with significant authority and, as a 
large but not unreasonable step, did much to make later decisions like Mizrahi less shocking.  
 
In Sarid, the petitioner brought suit because the Knesset Chairman had scheduled an 
important Knesset vote at an unusual time.
101
 The petitioner argued that the Court could hear the 
petition because it challenged a decision made by a public official in his official capacity.
102
 The 
Court held that even if the Chairman did violate Knesset regulations, this violation was minor 
and did not require the Court to intervene.
103
 The Court initially noted that the very act of 
deciding this case implicated the separation of powers doctrine.
104
 The Court held that ruling on 
this petition would violate the separation of powers because this “violation is minor and does not 
affect the basic structure of our parliamentary system, [so] the independence of the Knesset 
                                                          
94
 It is worth emphasize that these are fundamental Israeli cases quoting fundamental American decisions. Put a 
different way, American cornerstones became Israeli cornerstones.  
95
 Id. at 11. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Cf. The Court’s Mizrahi decision.  
98
 Jabotinskey, 5 P.D. at 11-12.  
99
 Id. at 11. 
100
 Id. 
101
 Sarid, 36(2) PD at ¶ 1 (opinion of Barak, J.)  
102
 Id.  
103
 Id. at ¶ 10.  
104
 Id. at ¶ 5. 
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should prevail and the court will stay its hand.”105 But, if the violation were “substantial and 
infringe[d] upon basic values of our legal order,” the rule of law must be protected.106  
 
In other words, the deviation from the norm must be strikingly egregious for the Court to 
interfere with the legislative process. Philosophically, this case implicates the power of the 
legislature to do as it pleases (within the Basic Law) pitted against the need for laws to be made 
in an orderly, proper way, and Justice Barak highlighted these concerns.
107
 
 
To decide whether a violation is minor or substantial, Justice Barak crafted a test that 
relied on American law. However, first he differentiated sharply between quasi-judicial and 
legislative decisions of the Knesset, noting that while the former are open to stricter examination, 
the latter are afforded a higher level of deference.
108
 Further, the internal rules of the Knesset and 
the management of the Knesset’s proceedings are solely the province of the Knesset.109 
 
Justice Barak outlined his new separation of powers rule using two American cases: 
Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486 (1969) and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). He used 
Powell as support for his argument that the Court should judicially review internal Knesset 
actions only when the actions are quasi-judicial (e.g., punishing a Knesset member).
110
 He then 
quoted Poe, which supports the idea that determining justiciability is not a scientific process, but 
is influenced by several factors.  
 
It is necessary to comment on the influence of Justice Barak here.
111
 Sarid was published 
in 1982, long before Justice Barak became President of the Court. But, even here it appears he is 
setting the stage for his Revolution, which would not culminate for another decade. He 
developed a completely malleable standard, allowing the Court to interfere “when the violation 
complained of is manifest, and impairs substantive values of our constitutional regime.”112 He 
made a switch that he could turn on or off nearly as he pleased—and this switch can be thrown 
as often as the situation demands.
113
 This test is a pretty fundamental shift from earlier decisions, 
and it seems that Justice Barak crafts it specifically so that he can later actively rule from the 
bench with more authority and flexibility.  
 
iii. Mizrahi, 49(4) PD 221114 
 
                                                          
105
 Id. at ¶ 9. 
106
 Id. 
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 Id. at ¶ 7.  
108
 Id. at ¶ 5. 
109
 Id. at ¶ 7 (“Paramount considerations relating to the separation of powers, the independence of parliament and the 
mutual respect which should prevail between state authorities, require that the Knesset enjoy freedom of action in 
managing its proceedings as it deems fit, without having its acts scrutinized by outside authorities. Were the court to 
sit in judgment over the propriety of Knesset proceedings, this body would be unable to function properly, and the 
court too will be flooded with litigation that turns it into a perpetual arena of political and procedural conflicts.”).  
110
 Id. at ¶ 9.  
111
 His influence is further discussed below. See infra, Section IV.  
112
 Sarid, 36(2) PD at ¶ 9.  
113
 Id. “we commend a flexible criterion which, by its very nature defies exact definition, and the content and scope 
of which will be determined by the court according to the needs of the time, and the matter involved” 
114
 The importance of Mizrahi is discussed above. See supra, Section I(e). 
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In Mizrahi the petitioners challenged a property law passed by the Knesset.
115
 President 
Barak, writing for the majority, chose to answer the question of whether the Court could strike 
down the law because it violated the 1992 additions to the Basic Law—i.e., whether the Court, 
treating the Basic law as a constitution, had the power of constitutional judicial review.
116
 
President Barak turned to United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), to show that the ideas of 
separation of powers and judicial review are inextricably intertwined.
117
 He noted that “judicial 
review of constitutionality both derives from and gives expression to the principle of separation 
of powers.”118 President Barak, quoting Nixon, stated: 
 
As Chief Justice Burger noted: “In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each 
branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution . . . . Many decisions 
of this Court, however, have unequivocally reaffirmed the holding of Marbury v. 
Madison . . . . That [it] is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to 
say what the law is . . . . Any other conclusion would be contrary to the basic concept of 
powers and the checks and balances that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government 
. . . .” 
 
Mizrahi, 49(4) PD at ¶ 79 (opinion of Barak, Pres.). Even to a casual reader, it becomes quickly 
apparent that President Barak is not just quoting Nixon for Nixon’s sake, however. He is, in fact, 
using Nixon as a vehicle to reach back to the legitimacy of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 
(1803), the cornerstone of American jurisprudence. If there is any SCOTUS case so basic, so 
fundamental to a democracy that its principles transcend time, culture, and language, Marbury is 
it.  
 
And what does this reliance on Marbury reveal? Well, in America and Israel, the 
judiciary “say[s] what the law is” because someone must say what the law is, and this role is 
particularly suited to the temperament and training of judges.
119
 Moreover, judicial review 
maintains the separation of powers because it acts as a check on the executive and legislative 
branches.
120
 
 
In sum, in Mizrahi the Court takes the most distinctively American aspect of the 
American Constitution—judicial review of legislation to determine compatibility with a 
constitution—as laid out by America’s most fundamental case—Marbury—and uses it to 
reshape the core of its own constitutional jurisprudence and the Court’s role in Israeli politics. 
President Barak’s decision was a legitimacy-infused way to bring the Court to the forefront of 
decision-making in Israel. It is hard to get more philosophically reliant than that.   
 
iv. HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense 52(5) PD 481 (1998) 
 
                                                          
115
 Mizrahi, 49(4) PD at ¶ 1 (opinion of Shamgar, Former Pres.).  
116
 Mizrahi, 49(4) PD at Introduction (opinion of Barak, Pres.).   
117
 Id. at ¶ 79. 
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 Id.  
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 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.  
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 Mizrahi, 49(4) PD at ¶ 79 (opinion of Barak, Pres.).   
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In the late 1990s, the Minister of Defense routinely granted military service exemptions 
to Ultra-Orthodox Jews studying religious law.
121
 The number of exemptions granted eventually 
reached almost 10% of those legally required to serve in the military.
122
 Several petitioners sued 
the Minister of Defense, arguing, inter alia, that the Minister of Defense lacked the authority to 
make this number of exemptions and that this authority instead rested with the Knesset.
123
 The 
Court agreed, holding that the Knesset, not the executive branch, is vested with the authority to 
make fundamental policy decisions that divide society, and that the routine granting of 
exemptions and deferrals to such a large group of people is such a decision.
124
 
 
Rubinstein is, if nothing else, a massive exercise in comparative law. Each of its prongs 
was based on American Constitutional law.
125
 The Court differentiated between “primary” and 
“secondary” arrangements, holding that primary arrangements should be adopted by the Knesset 
while secondary arrangements by agencies.
126
 In support of this precise wording, the Court 
quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Indus. Union Dept. v. American Petro. Inst., 
448 U.S. 607 (1980).
127
 And, the Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 
23 U.S. 10 (1825), in support of the proposition that this dichotomy is not usually clear.
128
 The 
Court also pointed to America’s digression from strict non-delegation as authority for its 
malleable standard.
129
  
 
After using American law to simultaneously build and fence in its philosophical 
conclusion, the Court moved on to discuss three specific justifications for separation of powers. 
These three legs are: (1) primacy of the legislature under the respective system of government, 
(2) rule of law, and (3) primacy of the legislature as a basis for democracy.
130
 Each leg of this 
three-legged stool was supported either in part or wholly by American constitutional law. 
 
For example, the Court pointed to Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), as 
supporting authority for (1) and Rapp v. Carey, 375 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1978) as support for 
(2).
131
 For (3), the Court used American cases to show that in democracies, the legislature—the 
elected representative of the people—is the body upon whom it chiefly falls to enact policy; 
policy decisions are so closely tied to the people, so the body most closely tied to the people 
ought to make those decisions.
132
 Agencies are neither responsible nor endowed in a similar way, 
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 Rubinstein, 52(5) PD at Introduction (opinion of Barak, Pres.). 
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 Id. 
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 Id. at ¶ 43. 
125
 Every one of the prongs for this decision was partially based on American constitutional law, though these 
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 Id. at ¶ 19. 
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 Id. at ¶ 20.  
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 Id. at ¶ 25. 
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adopted by the legislative body.”).  
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and the Court supported this by pointing to United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967). Thus, 
standards must accompany the delegation of policy-making power to agencies.
133
 
 
Finally, President Barak examined the fundamental purpose of this discussion and quoted 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), to support the proposition that this discussion is not 
just all done for semantics or formalism, but that the separation of powers produces real and 
necessary benefits by pitting the different the branches against each other.
134
  Rubinstein fits 
perfectly with President Barak’s theme of taking American thoughts and ideals and recasting 
them into an Israeli-sized system. And this case is also an effort to clarify basic philosophical 
values perhaps obscured or blurred by Mizrahi; so, even though President Barak authored both 
Rubinstein and Mizrahi, Rubinstein, in its own way, represents a subsequent reaction to Mizrahi.  
 
v. HCJ 4885/03 Israel Poultry Farmers Ass’n v. Gov’t of Israel 59(2) PD 14 
(2004) 
 
The Court does not always agree with American law on separation of powers issues.
135
 In 
Poultry Farmers, it considered a certain aspect of the evolution of American’s separation of 
powers jurisprudence troubling and explicitly declined to follow it.
136
 That is, it declined to 
follow SCOTUS’s scrutiny of Congress’s legislative history to ensure legislative due process.137 
Thus, even though the issue of legislative due process is not core to the separation of powers 
framework in either country, it is an issue that the Court felt strongly enough about to comment 
on using comparative law and then reject. 
 
In Poultry Farmers, the petitioners challenged the legislative process of the Knesset, 
arguing that it had passed a law too quickly and, thus, without “legislative due process.”138 Right 
away the Court looked to American law. The Court noted that in American courts there is a 
growing trend to, “within the framework of examining the constitutionality of statutes, . . . 
examine[] also the minutes of the deliberations of Congress during the legislative process in 
order to check whether Congress relied on a sufficient factual basis.”139 It stated that this: 
 
[‘L]egislative due process’ approach has not yet been adopted by the United States 
Supreme Court, even though judicial review of the legislative process is recognized in the 
United States. . . . But as we shall make clear below, even if the ‘legislative due process’ 
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administrative authorities are . . . . The purpose of judicial review of the legislative process is not to ensure that the 
Knesset carries out the optimal legislative process. The purpose of judicial review of the legislative process is also 
not to ensure that the Knesset carries out a responsible and balanced process for each draft law”). 
137
 Id. 
138
 Again, as an American law student, I am bemused by the notion that a government passes a law “too quickly” 
when mine cannot seem to pass one at all.  
139
 Id. at ¶ 27. The court further noted United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 
531 U.S. 356 (2001), as examples of this trend. It is worth noting the irony of considering Lopez, usually thought of 
by American scholars as a conservative decision because of its focus on federalism, as being too liberal.  
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approach had been embraced in its entirety by the United States Supreme Court, this far-
reaching approach is unacceptable in our legal system. 
 
Poultry Farmers, 59(2) PD at ¶ 27. In sum, the Court held that the legislative process is not an 
administrative decision; nor is it the job of the Court to ensure the optimal legislative process; 
nor does the process for each law need to be balanced and fair.
140
 All of these are questions for 
the Knesset and fall outside the Court’s reach.141 Indeed, the Court emphasized caution in ever 
critiquing how the Knesset does its job.
142
 
 
III. CITATIONS THE COURT GOT WRONG: HCJ 6427/02 MOVEMENT FOR 
QUALITY GOVERNMENT IN ISRAEL V. THE KNESSET, 61(1) PD 619 (2006) 
 
Invariably, exercises in comparative law sometimes result in mistakes or misquoting.
143
 
Consequently, it is not surprising that in Movement, Justice Rivlin’s reliance on American cases 
was slightly off-kilter.
144
 However, to understand why this reliance was rather out of place, it is 
first necessary to know the facts and the rationale of Justice Rivlin’s decision. In Movement, the 
petitioner filed a petition to stop Mr. Hanegbi—who had previously been in some legal trouble—
from becoming Minister of Public Security.
145
 The Court denied the petition, holding that it 
would not intervene in the Prime Minister’s decision because to intervene would violate the 
bounds of judicial review.
146
 
 
Now, the Court can review any governmental organ;
147
 and every branch’s actions can be 
reviewed using a standard of reasonableness.
148
 The strictness of the review will vary depending 
on different factors such as “the type of body under review and the power that has been 
exercised.”149 For example, both the Knesset and the Government are afforded special deference 
because the Knesset is the elected body of the state, and the Government executes the will of the 
state.
150
 However, this respect for the “separation of powers does not imply that each branch may 
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 Id. at ¶ 28. Though, obviously, the results of Knesset deliberations may create reviewable product.  
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 See, supra Section I(a). See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 28, at 72-73 (“For example, the Israeli Supreme Court 
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 It should be noted that, in the opinion of the author, Justice Rivlin did not need these cases to develop any law—
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 Movement, 61(1) PD at ¶ 5. The petition did not argue that the Basic law prohibited Mr. Hanegbi from being 
appointed, both parties admitted it did not, but it did argue that the Prime Minister’s judgment in appointing Hanegbi 
was within a “range of reasonableness.” 
146
 Id. at ¶ 35. 
147
 Id. at ¶ 9 (“All organs of government are subject to judicial review. The power of judicial review over decisions 
of the Knesset, the Government, and the other governing institutions is the cornerstone of a democracy which 
upholds the rule of law. It reflects the formal rule of law, meaning that all of the organs of government are 
subordinate to the law. It also means that everything is subject to judicial review, which is intended to guarantee that 
the law is kept.”) (citations omitted).   
148
 Id. (“In light of the above, it has been stated on more than one occasion that this Court is charged with overseeing 
the legality and reasonableness of the activities of the State.”).  
149
 Id. at ¶ 10. 
150
 Id. at ¶ 11. The court went on to explain that the Knesset and the Government were elected by the public, that 
certain areas of authority are relegated solely to them, and that “[t]he underlying principles of democracy, among 
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act as it wishes,” but rather that “each branch is independent in dealing with its own affairs, so 
long as it operates within the bounds of its authority.”151 Also, the nature of the power exercised 
is an equally important consideration when defining judicial review.
152
 
 
In Justice Rivlin’s opinion, the first and primary opinion in this case, he thoroughly 
discusses the idea of the separation of powers. Focusing on this case, Justice Rivlin stated that 
“[w]hen reviewing an act of the executive branch, the Court determines whether a reasonable 
authority would have been permitted to act in a similar manner.”153 Of course, there is a range of 
reasonableness within which the Government can act, and this range is influenced by the 
deference afforded the branch in question.
154
 In other words, the Court stated that using unique, 
branch-specific powers entitled a branch to a higher level of deference in that action.
155
  
 
Then Justice Rivlin stated: “The Court does not regard itself as a supra-governing body. 
See 1843/93 [10], at 499; see also Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) [92]; INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) [93].” Both Goldberg and Chadha do include language to the 
effect that the Court is not a super-legislature that will replace legitimate executive or legislative 
branch decisions with its own reasoning.
156
 However, more pertinently for our wrongful citation 
discussion, Chadha also states that “[o]nce the meaning of an enactment is discerned and its 
constitutionality determined, the judicial process comes to an end.”157 That is, under the 
American separation of powers doctrine, the Court ceases reviewing once it discovers 
specifically what has been done and decides that this action comports with the Constitution.  
 
Conversely, here, Justice Rivlin quickly found that the law in question complied with the 
Basic Law (Israel’s Constitution),158 but then he continued to discuss the legitimacy of the 
decision. This is a strange action, given that the Chadha held that the court’s ultimate inquiry is 
constitutionality, which Justice Rivlin had already dispensed with by deciding that the action 
comported with the Basic Law. 
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that by invalidating the legislative veto act in Chadha, 
SCOTUS ended up also invalidating several other provisions due to the legislative veto’s prolific 
use. Justice White noted in his dissent in Chadha that SCOTUS, through Chadha, had struck 
“down in one fell swoop provisions in more laws enacted by Congress than the Court has 
cumulatively invalidated in its history[, and that] it will now be more difficult to ‘insur[e] that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
them the separation of powers, require that the Court not trespass the boundaries of the Knesset and the 
Government.” Id. at ¶ 12. 
151
 Id. at ¶ 9 
152
 Id. at ¶ 12. 
153
 Id. 
154
 Id. This deference is analogous to Chevron deference.  
155
 Id. (“Deference, by contrast, is an institutional concept. Deference means that, in examining decisions of other 
authorities acting within the boundaries of their authority, the Court will not evaluate the wisdom of these decisions 
or overrule their discretion.”). 
156
 Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 68 (“In deciding the question before us we must be particularly careful not to substitute 
our judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress, or our own evaluation of evidence for a reasonable 
evaluation by the Legislative Branch.”); Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944, (“We do not sit as a committee of review, nor are 
we vested with the power of veto.”).  
157
 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944. 
158
 Movement, 61(1) PD at ¶¶ 1-8. 
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the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made’” by the legislature.159 Yet, the 
Court here uses Chadha in support of its judicial conservatism—the notion that the Court should 
avoid disturbs legislative decisions.  In sum, though he relies on it for one point, Justice Rivlin’s 
actions are inconsistent with Chadha as a whole. 
 
IV. INFLUENCE OF LEADING JURISTS 
 
The individual views of the Court justices are no less influential a factor in the prevalence 
of comparative law than the general expertise and illustriousness of SCOTUS. Obviously, 
SCOTUS is only influential if its jurisprudence is applied; without justices willing and eager to 
use SCOTUS jurisprudence, it has no more impact on the Court than a Nepali mountain tribunal.  
 
So why do justices choose to apply American law? There are three main reasons: First, as 
was noted above, some similarities of America’s and Israel’s legal and political systems make 
comparative law exercises with America easier because SCOTUS cases are, thus, on average, 
more applicable than many other countries’ cases.160 Many basic American ideals—rooted, like 
many of Israel’s foundational jurisprudential concepts, in English common law—are attractive to 
the justices.
161
  
 
Second, individual justices all promote their own ideologies. These ideologies are 
perhaps the single most efficient method of applying comparative law. Indeed, the Court is a 
good case study of how individual justices’ views are the “paramount factor” in determining 
which countries’ citations will be quoted and on what topics.162 Using justices’ individual 
philosophies helps explain and clarify what might otherwise be a jumbled mishmash of 
comparative law citations. Undeniably, American comparative law is fertile ground for idea-
shopping. If a justice wants to promote a specific ideology, America’s corpus juris provides a 
rich, buffet-style array of ideas from which justices may pick whatever concepts are convenient 
whenever it suits them.
163
  
 
Third, even if, as some scholars argue, certain justices do not actively “country-shop” for 
legitimacy, the country and system in which justices are educated is a major contributor to their 
later decision-making because justices are apt to adopt the judicial culture of the country in 
which they learned the law.
164
 “[T]he fact that many Israeli justices were born or educated in 
foreign countries” explains much of the Court’s comparative law jurisprudence.165 The influence 
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of educational systems on a country’s jurisprudence is on full display in the Israeli system. Many 
justices were trained overseas in the common law systems of England and America, especially in 
the early days of the Court.
166
 And, many other justices were steeped in Eastern European 
traditions.
167
 Finally, instead of just letting Israeli law students go to America, starting in the 
1960s “U.S.-style legal education” was moderately transplanted into Israeli law schools.168 
 
There are two justices in particular whose educations have tethered the Court’s 
jurisprudence closely to American law: Justices Agranat and Barak. Justice Agranat was 
American and completed his education in the United States,
169
 and Justice Barak trained for a 
year at Harvard Law. Consequently, the reliance of these justices on American law should be no 
surprise.
170
As all justices do, Justices Agranat and Barak consciously chose the countries they 
wanted Israel to at least partially legitimacy from. And, quite often, on foundational issues like 
separation of powers or judicial review, American law was the bedrock upon which these 
justices’ decisions rested.171  
 
Additionally, For Justice Agranat, it was well known that American Justice Frankfurter 
was his hero.
172
 For Justice Barak, his reliance on American law may not only have come from 
his year spent at Harvard. Some scholars have hypothesized that he has also “been influenced by 
the time he has spent in American law schools” as a professor.173 Either way, Justice Barak 
persuasively and effectively used American law is because he spent time with the law—as a 
student or teacher—in America’s educational system.174 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Clearly, the Court uses comparative law to borrow legitimacy from American law; for 
example, explicitly in Jabotinskey, and brazenly in Mizrahi. Two strong themes define the use of 
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American law to support the Court’s judicial restraint and separation of powers jurisprudence: 
First, American law was used in justices’ contemporaneous and subsequent reactions to the 
Revolution in an attempt to manage the Revolution’s aftershocks. Second, when American law is 
used, it is most often used to provide the philosophical basis for a doctrine of the Court; or, it is 
used to elucidate and number the elements of a rule. Of course, sometimes the Court gets 
American cases wrong—this is the danger of comparative law exercises. Finally, the Court uses 
American law not just because it needs to borrow legitimacy, but can also because of the 
similarities between America and Israel and the justices’ personal ideologies and education. 
